Lack is without a doubt one of the major terms of negativity that has virulently animated the traditional culture of sense—of meaning and representation. It has regulated object relations, in particular relations to technical objects; but it has also presented subjects with a constant lack of sense and being, with a principled understanding of being and one’s relation to the world under the sign of lack, and as governed by the regime of production and work. Lack is probably the most important term of a minoritizing formation of technical objects and technicity as such. For a long time, the West determined the place and stake of the technico-medial question along these lines. However, the transition from technics to technology and the related transformation in the culture of sense that gave way to a world of technical becoming, demands the bracketing of such an ontology of lack—of the kind of ontology that has dominated philosophy since Plato’s Protagoras, and that was particularly prominent at the end of the nineteenth century, and going into the twentieth—from Ernst Kapp and Henri Bergson via Sigmund Freud, Arnold Gehlen, Günther Anders, Teilhard de Chardin all the way to Marshall McLuhan, André Leroi-Gourhan, and Gotthard Günther. In all of their works, one finds a negative anthropological and ontological technodicea that is again and again presented as the deciphering and explanation of technical being. It casts the human being as a being of lack, and characterizes all artefactuality as prosthetic compensation, a question of a supplementary organology.61 Today, we are—due to technology and technological objects that inaugurate new object relations—in a world of radicalized technological becoming. It may even be that we have arrived at the outer limit of a history of lack: at the point where lack no longer lacks anything—no lack of essence, aim, determination, ground. Where lack is becoming the lack of nothing, and where the great senso-cultural figure and supreme sign of negativity (namely lack) finally comes home to its disappearance and provokes only failed readings. It may be that we have arrived at a point where being and lack are no longer combined, where this evidence that was constitutive for the West loses its force of persuasion, where the fascination with lack begins to lose its logic of abandonment and we can begin to think on the far side of lack? Isn’t this the decisive exigency of our new situation in the history of sense, the exigency that represents the consequence of a creationist technology that surpasses lack, in other words: that leaves behind the entire senso-cultural regime of lack including its central notions of essence, aim, determination, ground, that have been lacking for as long as we can remember? Isn’t this what is at stake today in our self-descriptions?62 And shouldn’t we also liberate from this regime our descriptions of media and technology, as appears to happen as well in Nancy’s supplementary and prosthetic conception of technics?